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CASE NOTES
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE- Antitrust Law. Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
With the recent denial of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme
Court, Occidental Petroleum v. Buttes. Gas & Oil Co.' can take
its place among the growing number of cases to raise the act
of state doctrine of judicial restraint.2 In doing so, Occidental
may signal the end of one of the basic premises in the ana-
lytical development of the act of state doctrine and foreshadow
the merger of what has been two distinct lines of cases under
the doctrine.
Analysis of Occidental must begin with the classification
of its factual content as it relates to the two lines of cases,
then follow with an inquiry into the different analytical bases
for the doctrine itself.3
An action was brought by the Occidental Petroleum Cor-
poration against Buttes Gas and Oil Company, Clayco Petro-
leum Corporation 4 and their respective officers, in a private
antitrust suit for treble damages and an injunction.5 The
complaint alleged an intricate conspiracy to restrain trade and
monopolize "the exploration, development and exploitation of
petroleum reserves of the territorial waters of the Trucial
States"'6 in the Persian Gulf.
1331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Ca. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
2 The act of state doctrine is a rule of judicial restraint applied by American
courts since at least 1796, Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 230
(1796), whereby courts have declined to act when having to examine the
validity of a foreign act of state. See generally, RESTATEMENT OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, §§ 41-43 (1962).
3 The case has inspired a number of insightful and probing comments. See,
65 AM. J. INT'L L. 815 (1971); 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 251 (1971);
7 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 247 (1972); 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 413 (1972); and 3
RUTGERS CAMDEN L. J. 544 (1972). Unfortunately, however, most com-
ments have failed to develop a clear distinction between the various cases
which have applied the doctrine, an exercise which is necessary in the
understanding of Occidentals historical perspective and future signifi-
cance.
4 A motion to dismiss Clayco and its president, Clayman, was granted on
three grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and de-
fective service of process. 331 F. Supp. at 95-98.
5 Clayton Act, §§ 4, 16; 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-26, (1970).
6 331 F. Supp. at 95. The Trucial States consisted of several Sheikdoms
along the Persian Gulf, some of which were rich in oil, deriving the name
"Trucial" from truces imposed upon them by Great Britain 150 years ago.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1971, at 13, col. 1. See in general H. ALBAHARNA, THE
LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABIAN GULF STATES (1968). Britain recognized
the "sovereignty" of the Trucial States, but exercised "protecting power
in matters of external affairs," E. LAUTERPACHT, BRrrISH PRACTICE IN
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In 1969, the plaintiff, Occidental, was granted a conces-
sion in the United States to explore and extract any oil under-
lying the territorial and off-shore waters of the Sheikdom of
Umm al Qaywayn. Shortly thereafter, Buttes received a similar
concession from the adjoining Trucial State of Sharjah. At the
time of the concessions, the Sheikdom of Sharjah asserted
sovereignty to the island of Abu Musa located about 38 miles
off the coast of the mainland, and in a strategic position in the
Strait of Hormutz which is the mouth of the Persian Gulf.7
Occidental and Buttes worked in cooperation, exchanging in-
formation from seismic tests in their respective areas until
March 1970. At that time Occidental's tests indicated the exist-
ence of large quantities of oil lying approximately nine miles
off the island of Abu Musa, and within their alleged concession
area. Upon this discovery, Occidental alleges that Buttes em-
barked on a plan to gain the concession in the oil-rich area
for themselves. The alleged plan included the inducement of
Sharjah to claim territorial waters of 12 miles off Abu Musa
by means of back-dated decrees, inducing Iran to claim sov-
ereignty over the island, and finally inducing Britain to coerce
the Ruler of Umm al Qaywayn to suspend the concession granted
Occidental.8
I. THE PARTY/NON-PARTY DISTINCTION
Upon examination there emerge essentially two distinct
types of cases which have arisen under the act of state doc-
trine. The first line can be called the "foreign-party" cases.
In these, a foreign sovereign has been an actual party to the
INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (1965). In other words, England exclusively
determined the foreign policy of the Sheikdoms. More recently six of
the Sheikdoms, including the two concerned with this case, have formed
the "Union of Arab Emirates" and are now independent, both domes-
tically and internationally from Great Britain. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1971,
at 12, col. 3; id., Jan. 25, 1972, at 6, col. 1. Now many indications exist
that Iran is filling essentially the same role as Britain had before the
British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in December 1971.
V The strategic importance of the island is vividly demonstrated by the
dramatic reaction of Iraq to the occupation by Iranian troops on Novem-
ber 30 1971. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1971, at 13, col. 1; id., Dec. 2, 1971,
at 19, col. 1; id., Dec. 3, 1971, at 12, col. 6; id., Dec. 8,1971, at 11, col. 1;
id., Jan. 1, 1972, at 2, col. 4.
8 331 F. Supp. at 99-101. On the later point, Occidental claims that the
British Royal Air Force buzzed the home of the ruler by airplanes, sur-
rounded his house and threatened to exile him. Previously, Occidental
claimed that the Royal Navy had boarded its sea-going equipment under
force.9 An alternative an~iysis would be to breakdown the cases according to
their subject content (i.e. expropriation, antitrust, contracts, etc.) but
since the crucial element in the doctrine involves who the actor is, the
party breakdown seems more appropriate.
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suit either as a plaintiff,"' as a defendant being sued either
directly or through an agent," or as a party to litigation involv-
ing private rights affected by its acts.'2 The other cases fall into
a "foreign-non-party" category where the state's acts are ques-
tioned only collaterally in litigation between private citizens.' 3
Because the states involved in the charges are not joined in
the action, Occidental falls into the latter category. 14 The merger
of the legal-philosophical basis of the two lines of cases has
been accomplished by the gradual destruction, completed by
Occidental, of the analytical foundation of the "foreign-non-
party" line of cases.
II. THE ANALYTIcAL DisTmCnONs
As early as 1796 the roots of the American doctrine were
developed in Ware v. Hylton. 5 In refusing to invalidate the
confiscation of money owed a British citizen by Virginia during
the Revolutionary War, the court invoked the principles of
national sovereignty and international comity.' 6
These same principles were called into use 100 years later,
in a case which virtually all commentators rely upon as the
classic statement of the act of state doctrine, Underhill v. Her-
nandez17 That court declared that "[e]very sovereign State is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own terri-
tory." This is an example of the national sovereignty approach
1OBanco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
11 Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders Protective Council Inc., 283 App. Div. 44,
125 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1953).
12 National Institute of Agrararian Reform v. Kane, 153 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
App. 1963).
.a Oetjen v. Central Leather, 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
4 In Occidental the defendant argued that Great B6itain, Iran, Sharjah and
Umm al Qaywayn were all "indispensible parties" to the case and re-
quired to be joined under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. In considering possible remedies and how they would affect the
above parties, the court decided that they were not "indispnsible parties"
and that the action could be pursued in their absence, 331 F. Supp. at 107.
15 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
10' I shall conclude my observations on the right to confiscate any British
property, by remarking, that the validity of such a law would not be
uestioned in the Court of Chancery of Great Britain: and I confess the
octrine seems strange to me in an American Court of Justice. In the
case of Wright and Nutt, Lord Chancellor Thurlow declared, that he con-
sidered an act of the state of Georgia, passed in 1782, for the confiscation
of real and personal estate of Sir JamesWright, and also his debts, as a
law of an independent country; and concluded with the following ob-
servation, that the law of every country must be equally regarded in the
courts of justice of Great Britain, whether the law was of a barbarious
or civilized institution, or wise or foolish. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 230.
17 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
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to the act of state.'8 Significantly, Underhill falls into the "for-
eign-party" group of cases in which the sovereign is a party to
the suit through its agent who is being sued." Though most
cases in this line pay homage to Underhill by citing the basic
rule, its fundamental principles have been blurred. This has
resulted from a lack of careful analysis of Underhill itself and
of its English and American precedents which emphasized the
importance of international comity to the national sovereignty
premise.
2 0
Modern analysis of the "foreign-party" cases finds the roots
of the doctrine in separation of powers. The most explicit state-
ment is found in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.21 The
financial agent of the Cuban government brought an action in
the United States courts to recover money paid for a sugar
shipment over which the Cuban government claimed owner-
ship by expropriation. It appeared that the issue was whether
the act of state doctrine would apply when the act was a vio-
lation of international law.2 2 The court skirted this question,
18 This approach is not uniquely American. In English courts the doctrine
seems to develop as a reaction to the abhorent thought of a jury of com-
moners sitting in judgment of the acts of a sovereign. See Blad v. Ban-
field, 3 Swans 605 (App.), (Chancery 1674). Here a Danish citizen was
asking a permanent injunction to restrain proceedings for seizure of prop-
erty of English subjects in Iceland pursuant to orders from the King of
Denmark. The court remarked, "[n]ow after all this, to send it to a trial at
law, where either the Court must pretend to judge the validity of the
King's letters, patent in Denmark, or the exposition and meaning of the
articles of peace; or that a common jury should try whether the English
have a right to trade in Iceland, is monstrous and absurd."
19 The defendant, Hernandez, was head of the anti-government force in
Venezuela which on October 6, 1892 took command of the capital, and on
October 23 was formally recognized as the legitimate government of
Venezuela by the United States. 168 U.S. at 251.
20 These principles have recently been recognized by Justice White dissent-
ing in Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 442. He is especially concerned that Under-
hill was settled "on the merits of plaintiff's claim under international
law."
21 Supra, note 10, at 423. "The act of state doctrine dces have constitutional
underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches
of government in a system of separation of powers . . . the doctrine as
formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial
Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of for-
eign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of
goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the
international sphere." See also Jimenex v. Aristeguieta 311 F.2d 547
(5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1962); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); and Metzger,
The Act of State Doctrine, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, (1972).
22 There was a strong interest on this point in the international legal com-
munity, and a good deal of sentiment to suspend the doctrine in these
types of cases if there exists a clear violation of international law. (Among
those filing briefs of amici curiae generally supporting this view were the
American Bar Association, the Executive Committee of the American
Branch of the International Law Association, and the Committee on In-
ternational Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
This view has recently prevailed in First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), discussed in note 23, infra. See
also R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIc COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
CASE NOTES
however, by declaring that it could not apply international law
because "[t] here are few if any issues in international law today
on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on
a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens. '23 The
court did imply, however, that when issues of international
law are explicit and not very important, the act of state doc-
trine might be overcome .2 4
III. THE DIsTINCTIONs APPLIED TO OCCIDENTAL
It is the Sabbatino approach which is endorsed by the court
in Occidental. "In sum, the doctrine is a reflection of the execu-
tive's primary competency in foreign affairs, and an acknowledg-
ment of the fact that in passing upon governmental acts the
judiciary may hinder or embarrass the conduct of our foreign
relations. ' 25 Thus the Occidental court applied a line of reason-
ing developed in the series of "foreign-party" cases to which
Occidental does not belong. In order to exercise judicial re-
straint, the court was forced to adopt this analysis because of
the erosion of the doctrine's basis as developed in the "foreign-
non-party" cases to which Occidental does belong.
The line of non-party cases began with American Banana
v. United Fruit Co.26 According to the Occidental court, "the
facts of that case are strikingly similar to those now before the
court. '27 United Fruit was being sued under the Sherman Act
ORDER 64-138 (1964) for an exhaustive analysis; also J. White, dissenting,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964).
23 376 U.S. at 428. This decision involved such a negative response that the
Congress reacted by essentially overruling it in the so-called "Sabbatino
Amendment," 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1970), which provides that "no
court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act
of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to
the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or
other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state
(or party claiming through such state based upon (or traced through) a
confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959 by an act of that state
in violation of the principles of international law."
Subsequently, the Court overruled the application of the doctrine by
the Court of Appeals in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) partly on the grounds that the Executive
Branch had asked the Court not to invoke the doctrine-thus a complete
departure from Sabbatino in this respect. Additionally, the Court in-
structed the lower courts to apply customary rules of international law to
determine the validity of the expropriation of the plaintiff's property by
the government of Cuba.
24 "The greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a par-
ticular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it . . . the less important the
implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the
justification for exclusivity in the political branches" Supra, note 10,
at 428.
25 331 F. Supp. at 108-109.
2-; 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
27 331 F. Supp. at 109.
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for treble damages for allegedly inducing the Costa Rican army
to seize and maintain control of the plaintiff's banana planta-
tion. In affirming the lower courts' refusal to try the case,
Justice Holmes wrote: "A seizure by a state is not a thing that
can be complained of elsewhere in the courts.128
The basis of the decision, however, was primarily a con-
flict of laws approach based solidly on the notion of interna-
tional comity.2 9 Holmes was quite clear: "the general and al-
most universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done."30 This jurisdictional conflict
of laws, based on the situs of the wrong, has been rarely in-
voked by the courts which followed. The jurisdictional aspect
has generally been either distinguished31 or greatly mini-
mized. s2 For example many cases which followed American
Banana in the "foreign-non-party" line generally ignored the
conflict of laws rationale in favor of international comity.
33
On the other hand, in the antitrust cases which followed, the
courts managed to clear the jurisdictional obstacle by not ap-
plying judicial restraint if the act "brought about forbidden
results within the United States, 3 4 or where "the conspiracy
was laid in the United States, and was effectuated both here
and abroad, 3 5 or for acts by "persons not within its allegiance,
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends, ' 36 or most recently by
"the test which determines whether the United States law
28 213 U.S. at 358.
29 "For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place
where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an inter-
ference- with authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations, which the other states concerned justly might resent." Id., at 365.
so Id. Holmes had used a similar rationale in a previous cause where an act
of the U.S. governor of Cuba was brought into question. See O'Reilly do
Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908). See also H. ZWARENSTEY, SOME
ASPECTS OF THE EXTRATERRIToIAL REACH OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST
LAws 124-125 (1970).
31 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927); Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
32 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 289 (1918); Ricaud v. American
Metal Co.. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
33 Justice Clark in Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. at 309 declared
that application of the doctrine "rests at last upon the highest considera-
tions of international comity and expediency. To permit the validity of
the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned
by the courts of another would very certainly 'imperil the amicable rela-
tions between governments and vex the peace of nations.'"
34 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 276.
35 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. at 706.0
36United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945).
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is applicable . . . focus[ing] on the nexus between the parties
and their practices and the United States. 8 7
As long as the cases which arose presented ways to avoid
application of the jurisdictional doctrine, American Banana
remained intact. But when Occidental appeared, with a factual
situation so similar to American Banana, the court had to choose
between completing the evolution of American Banana by tak-
ing the "foreign-non-party" cases out of the act of state doctrine
altogether, or attempting to bring the two lines of cases to-
gether under one doctrine based on the separation of powers
approach developed in Sabbatino.
Clearly, the court chose the latter. The thrust of this deci-
sion is exemplified by the endorsement of the "instructive
precedent . . . found in Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders Pro-
tective Council, 283 App. Div. 44, 125 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1953). ' '38
The court in Frazier declared that "[p] erhaps our courts should
be even more sensitive to the involvements of a sovereign's
action when the sovereign is not a party to the action and the
adjudication as it affects its prestige and dignity partakes of
the nature of an ex parte proceeding. '3 9
The Occidental court could have easily avoided the issue by
accepting any of Buttes' other motions to dismiss. 40 Instead it
chose to confront the issue directly. This is especially intriguing
in light of the fact that Buttes structured its motions to dismiss
on the jurisdictional principle of the act of state doctrine.41
In conclusion, the ultimate consequence of Occidental seems
to be the elimination of the conflict of laws roots of the act of
37 Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
38 331 F. Supp. at 111.
3" 238 App. Div. at 49, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (1953).40 Besides the act of state doctrine, Buttes moved to dismiss: 1. On grounds
that the court lacked jurisdiction because the act complained of had no
substantial impact in the United States- 2. Because it would mean having
to determine an international boundary dispute which the courts of the
United States may not do; 3. Because under Rule 19(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, joinder of Sharjah, Umm al Qaywayn, Iran
and Great Britain is necessary, (see note 14 infra); 4. Because the com-
plaint attacks activities undertaken to influence governmental conduct,
which is not within the subject matter of the antitrust laws. 331 F. Supp.
at 101-102.
41 "The Buttes defendants in their briefs have contended that this defect of
the complaint is jurisdictional. But it is clear from Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 308 (1918) . . . that this is not so; rather the
questioning of sovereign acts by the complaint results in its failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. American Banana, supra
166 F. at 267. When confronted with this discrepancy of grounds at oral
argument, counsel for the Buttes defendants contended finally that the
court should 'in the exercise of its jurisdiction' dismiss the complaint."
331 F. Supp. at 113.
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state doctrine and the downplaying of the national sovereignty
aspect. If Occidental is followed, the "foreign-non-party" line
of cases will merge with the foreign-party line, with the con-
trolling principle, judicial restraint, based on the separation of
powers analysis developed in the expropriation cases.
The next logical development in the evolution of the act
of state doctrine will come when the courts are confronted
with a clear violation of international law by a foreign state.4
2
Meanwhile businesses operating abroad can expect an easier
time invoking the doctrine now that the jurisdictional rule
which proved so easy to avoid or ignore has been replaced by
a more inclusive principle.
Will Ris
42 Such development may soon be forthcoming, see note 23 supra.
